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The development of intuitionist and/or constructivist philos- 
ophies of arithmetic in this century has given the study of Sir 
William Rowan Hamilton's doctrine of algebra as pure time rather 
more than merely historical significance. In a very interesting 
paper, Thomas Hankins has traced the development of Hamilton's 
thinking in this area, paying special attention, inevitably, to 
the influence of Kantianism in Hamilton's philosophy of mathe- 
matics [Hankins 19761. I believe it is possible to assert an 
even closer affinity between Kant's philosophy of mathematics 
and Hamilton's than has hitherto been suggested. Without enter- 
ing into the (probably sterile) debates concerning the extent 
of Hamilton's indebtedness to Kant, we will try to highlight 
the similarities of their thinking. 
As Hankins has pointed out, the aim of Hamilton's Preliminary 
and Elementary Essay on Algebra as the Science of Pure Time [1835] 
was overtly philosophical. Hamilton was trying to establish a 
philosophical basis for algebra that would anchor the latter in 
the ordinal character of real numbers. In Hamilton's words, he 
wished to improve the science, not the "Art" or the "Language" 
of algebra 11835, 41. Such a "scientific" basis must be "strict, 
pure, and independent; deduced by valid reasonings from its own 
intuitive principles; and thus not less an object of a priori 
contemplation than Geometry" [1835, 51. For Hamilton this 
meant basing algebra on "pure time" as the intuitively most 
immediate and consistent foundation. Algebra was to be "the 
Science of Order in Progression" 11835, 15-16; 1853, 1171. 
It is obvious that Hamilton would have been exceedingly inter- 
ested in Kant's notions of space and time as pure intuitions, 
and even more interested in the latter's suggestion, not only 
that geometry was the "science of space"--a suggestion about 
which Kant had a good deal to say --but also that algebra was 
the "science of pure time" (the analogous idea). According to 
Hamilton this latter idea remained completely undeveloped by 
Kant and, furthermore, it was only with Hamilton's own work on 
the foundations of algebra that Kant's vague suggestion first 
received a rigorous formulation. Pace Hamilton, not only is 
there a close affinity between his theory and Kant's suggestion, 
but there is a great deal more implicit development in the 
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critical philosophy of this general idea of Kant's than either 
Hamilton or most Kantian commentators have noticed. I have 
argued elsewhere that a less constricted interpretation of Kant- 
ianism in the philosophy of mathematics is possible, if one 
gives due weight to the implications of Kant's explicit pronounce 
ments on the idea of construction and the particular relationship 
this has to the difficult schematism doctrine [Winterbourne 1981, 
IV]. When the Kantian notion of construction is understood in 
relation to the schematism, Kant can be credited with a theory 
of algebra as well as his more familiar theory of geometry El]. 
Hankins has noted that Hamilton's reading of the Critique 
of Pure Reason encouraged him to publish his own ideas on the 
subject of algebra as pure time [Hankins 1976, 336; Hamilton 
1853, 1171. Thus Hamilton's ideas were given support by his 
encounter with Kant's writings but played little or no part in 
their genesis. Given that Kant's theory of algebra--such as it 
is--cannot be found entirely in the Transcendental Aesthetic 
(as Hamilton appears to have assumed) the affinity between the 
respective philosophical positions is even more striking: 
In all Mathematical Science we consider and compare 
relations. .In algebra the relations which we first 
consider and compare, are relations between successive 
states of some changing thing or thought. And numbers 
are the names or nouns of algebra; marks or signs, by 
which one of these successive states may be remembered 
and distinguished from another.... Relations between 
successive thoughts thus viewed as successive states 
of one more general and changing thought, are the pri- 
mary relations of algebra. For with Time and Space 
We connect all continuous change, and by symbols of Time 
and Space we reason on and realise progression. Our 
marks of temporal and local site, our then and there, 
are at once signs and instruments of that transformation 
by which thoughts become things.... And such a transfor- 
mation there is when, in Algebra, we contemplate the 
change of our own thoughts as if it were the progres- 
sion of some foreign thing, and introduce Numbers as 
the marks or signs to denote place in that progres- 
sion. [Hamilton, cited in Hankins 1976, 3361 
According to Hankins [1976], Hamilton wrote this passage before 
reading the Critique of Pure Reason. It is thus even more note- 
worthy that some of these remarks are so similar to what Kant 
had already written. For example, although Hamilton had not 
read this in Kant's work, he was echoing Kant very closely when 
he wrote that numbers are the "names" or "nouns" of algebra; 
that they are "marks or signs by which one of these successive 
states may be remembered and distinguished from another;" that 
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"our marks of temporal and local site, our then and there, are 
at once signs and instruments of that transformation by which 
thoughts become things;" and concluded that numbers are intro- 
duced as "marks" which denote the place reached in a progression. 
Indeed, Kant wrote that "to think a number in general" is "the 
representation of a method whereby a multiplicity . . . may be 
represented in an image in conformity with a certain concept" 
[Kant 1787, A140/B179]. Kant defines number as "the unity of 
the synthesis of the manifold of a homogeneous intuition in 
general, a unity due to my generating time itself in the appre- 
hension of the intuition." For Kant, what one might call the 
"movement" of consciousness produces "undifferentiated succes- 
sion" in the manifold of what Kant calls "inner sense" (i.e., 
in the pure intuition of time), and that number in general is 
the presented product of such a synthesis. That is to say, 
number is a conventional way of "marking' a determinate position 
in the manifold of inner sense [Winterbourne 1981, 421. Kant 
remarks elsewhere that numbers are to be regarded as 'sensuous 
epistemological tools' [Kant 1763, 241. 
A reading of [Hamilton 18351 reveals that Kant influenced 
the language in which Hamilton's theory was presented. But the 
preoccupation with the Transcendental Aesthetic--with its em- 
phasis on space and the science of space--prevented Hamilton 
from fully appreciating the extent to which his ideas on the 
foundations of algebra were implicit in Kant's critical philos- 
ophy - It is easy to see what Hamilton found so congenial to 
his own position in the Transcendental Aesthetic: "Time and 
space are, therefore, two sources of knowledge, from which 
bodies of a priori synthetic knowledge can be derived. (Pure 
mathematics is a brilliant example of such knowledge, especi- 
ally as regards space and its relations.)" [Kant 1787, A38/39, 
B55/56]. Space is the form of outer intuition, time is the 
form of inner (and outer) intuition; thus, for Kant, our ex- 
perience is minimally temporal and maximally spatiotemporal. 
From considerations like this, reached independently of his 
reading of Kant, Hamilton concluded that algebra was more gen- 
eral and more fundamental than geometry. If our temporal intu- 
ition is less "dispensable" than our spatial intuition and if 
algebra is the science of this pure intuition, then algebra is 
the most basic of the mathematical sciences. This idea, though 
not made explicit in the Aesthetic, can certainly be found else- 
where in the Critique of Pure Reason: 
Mathematics does not only construct magnitudes, (quanta) 
as in geometry; it also constructs magnitudes as such, 
(quantitas) as in algebra. In this it abstracts com- 
pletely from the properties of the object that is to be 
thought in terms of such a concept of magnitude.... 
198 NOTE HM 9 
Once it has adopted a notation for the general concept 
of magnitudes so far as their different relations are 
concerned, it exhibits in intuition, in accordance 
with certain universal rules, all the various opera- 
tions through which the magnitudes are produced and 
modified. Thus in algebra, by means of a symbolic 
construction, just as in geometry by means of an 
ostensive construction, we succeed in arriving at 
results which discursive knowledge could never have 
reached by means of mere concepts. [Kant 1787, B745] 
(For the implications of Kant's idea of "symbolic construction," 
see [Winterbourne 1981, IV].) 
Hamilton clearly believed that he had moved beyond Kant. 
Certainly his idea that time as pure intuition "will ultimately 
be found to be co-extensive and identical with Algebra, so far 
as Algebra itself is a science" [Hamilton 1835, 5, 71, probably 
goes much beyond anything either implicitly or explicitly at- 
tributable to Kant. However, it is not entirely clear what the 
force of the assertion--that algebra is the science of pure 
time--must be, or if this assertion entails more than the most 
general of analogies: that time is to algebra as space is to 
geometry. Hankins agrees with Hamilton's interpretation of 
Kant, insofar as Hamilton claims to have moved beyond Kant. 
This underestimates the significance of Kant's commitment to 
the constructive character of mathematics in both geometry and 
algebra. It is true, as Hankins indicates, that only in the 
Prolegomena did Kant openly assert that arithmetic was the 
science of time. Nonetheless, there is evidence that Kant held 
the view that time was not only more general--less dispensable-- 
than space, but also that algebra, qua symbol-system, was the 
ultimate science of time to which even spatial, geometrical 
constructions were, in principle, reducible [Winterbourne 1981, 
431. 
By means of "schemata," which are to be regarded as a priori 
determinations of time in accordance with rules, Kant could 
link algebra to the temporal character of mathematical construc- 
tion by means of the symbol.. Spatial constructions are thus 
dispensable, provided we possess an adequate symbol-system 
through which geometrical relations can be expressed. Kant 
could, in principle, accept a Cartesian translation of spatial 
relations in terms of an algebraic representation of these re- 
lations expressed in spatial figures. Such a reduction was 
explicitly accepted by Kant. To Kant, "Universal arithmetic," 
i.e., algebra, was an ampliative science; the remaining parts 
of pure mathematics "progress largely because of algebra," 
considered as the "universal theory of quantities" [Kant 1967, 
1291. 
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Hankins suggests that Hamilton [1835] had attempted to make 
precise the construction of number, whereas in Kant's work this 
concept was supposed to remain ambiguous [Hankins 1976, 3451 
and, further, that such an emphasis on construction brings 
Hamilton close to the ideas of modern intuitionism. However, 
it can be argued that Kant's notion of construction, when ex- 
tended by means of the implications of the idea of schematism 
as the basis for the number system, includes both algebraic 
and geometrical constructions and thus provides a closer link 
with intuitionism than even Brouwer, an avowed Kantian, would 
have admitted. A spatial construction is the representation 
of the abstract relations which constitute, for example, the 
general concept "triangularity": the figure is useful precisely 
because it embodies those relations which are less easily grasped 
independently of it [Winterbourne 1981, 361. 
It was Kant's emphasis on spatial constructions that has 
lead many commentators to assert that for Kant spatial figures 
were indispensable for geometrical science. When this is linked 
to the belief that Kant insisted on the logical impossibility 
of non-Euclidean geometries, then Kantianism in mathematics 
appears to be merely of historical interest. (In fact, he did 
not insist on this; see [Brittan 1978, 68; Winterbourne Sect.1, 
passim].) Yet to accept this reading, we must admit both that 
Kant did not mean what he said about the possibility of logi- 
cally consistent alternative geometries, and that, apparently, 
the program of Cartesian analytic geometry completely eluded 
his attention. This, however, is not plausible, and I have 
argued that Kant did have a theory of algebra which can accom- 
modate a Cartesian reduction of geometry to algebra. If this 
is correct, then Kant's stated theory of geometry allows for 
the possibility of alternatives; further, mutatis mutandis, his 
theory of algebra must also admit of alternatives. However, 
unlike the case of space and geometry, there is nothing either 
explicit or implicit in Kant's views of time and algebra that 
gives any clue to what an alternative algebra might have meant 
for him. But Hankins is wrong in suggesting that Hamilton 
could not appreciate non-Euclidean geometry simply because he 
was a Kantian. (The uniqueness that Kant attributed to the 
space of experience, the special place of Euclidean geometry 
in its formalization, and the uniqueness he apparently attri- 
buted to time, number, and algebra concern transcendental 
philosophy. These topics lie beyond the scope of this paper 
and are not discussed here.) 
For both Kant and Hamilton algebra was based on the idea 
of succession, rather than on number as such. The idea of 
algebra as pure time was implicit in Kant's expression of his 
general philosophy of mathematics, though the Transcendental 
Aesthetic, usually taken to be the core of this theory, is not, 
pace Hamilton, the place to find it. 
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Note 
1. For Kant constructions in space and time are symbolic 
instantiations which provide us with particular instances of 
general concepts. It is the possibility of constructing a con- 
cept--in pure intuition--which differentiates "real" from "merely 
logically possible" mathematical objects. In logical terms, 
construction in general permits the deduction of, say, F(a) from 
the existentially quantified sentence, (3 x) (Fx), in the natural 
deduction system. 
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